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IDENTITY PROTECTION OR NOT FOR EMPLOYEES REPORTING MONEY 
LAUNDERING? THE UK CASE 
 
ANNA SIMONOVA * 
 
The article highlights an issue which has received renewed attention due to the 
UK case Shah v. HSBC Private Bank determined by the Court of Appeal. The 
issue is the extent of identity protection of employees who are legally required 
to report suspicion of money laundering to the authorities. In its recent 
judgement, the court opens up for the possibility of disclosure of identities of 
reporting employees to a customer, thereby challenging the assumption that 
such employees are subject to public interest identity protection. 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
All financial institutions are required to comply with anti-money laundering (AML) 
measures. One of them is reporting suspicion of money laundering. This 
requirement means the following. If suspicion is reported to authorities and consent 
is granted by the authorities to proceed with the transaction in question, then the 
financial institution is not at risk of being prosecuted. Suspicion is defined as a 
possibility which is more than fanciful that the relevant facts exist. A vague feeling 
of unease does not suffice.1  
 
Even though suspicion is inherently subjective, the UK legislation is very clear 
about sanctioning failure to report suspicion where there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting money laundering.2 The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group 
(JMLSG) Guidance states that the test of reasonable suspicion is objective. The test 
would likely be met when there are demonstrated to be facts or circumstances, 
known to the member of staff, from which a reasonable person engaged in a 
business subject to the Money Laundering Regulations would have inferred 
knowledge, or formed the suspicion, that another person was engaged in money 
laundering.3  
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Copenhagen, Denmark. anna.simonova@jur.ku.dk  
1  Blair W & Brent R(2008) Banks and Financial Crime: The International Law of 
Tainted Money, Oxford University Press, p.167 
2  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, sections 330 & 331 
3  The JMLSG Guidance, Part I, par. 6.15 
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Financial institutions generally owe a duty of confidentiality towards their 
customer. The duty means that financial institutions have no right to disclose 
customer information to third parties unless such disclosure is authorised in 
exceptional circumstances. Disclosing suspicion of money laundering is an 
exception to the general rule. Financial institutions and their employees will not 
incur liability for disclosing customer information if such disclosure is made in the 
course of compliance with AML reporting obligations.4  
 
II SHAH V HSBC PRIVATE BANK 
 
The recent case Shah v.  HSBC Private Bank highlights another related issue - the 
issue as to whether identities of employees involved in the reporting process can be 
disclosed to a customer. The case is about two customers who sued their bank for 
delays in effecting their payment instructions on four occasions.5 The delays were 
up to 2 weeks. No evidence of money laundering was found by the police. It was 
alleged by the claimants that the delays had caused them economic loss and 
compensation was thus claimed. The delays resulted from the bank’s disclosure of 
suspicion to the authorities and anticipation of the authorities’ consent to proceed 
with the transactions.  The claimants challenged that the bank employees had really 
held that suspicion. The bank refused to disclose the identities of the employees 
involved in the reporting process except for the identity of the Money Laundering 
Reporting Officer.  
 
Financial institutions naturally have an interest in protecting their employees due to 
the risk of harm. There is no British statute which specifically and explicitly grants 
employees of financial institutions public interest immunity in the AML context. 
There are only recommendations in favour of that. These recommendations come 
from public bodies such as the British Bankers Association, the Home Office and 
the Serious Organised Crime Agency which is authorised to receive suspicious 
activity reports (SARs).6 Information on identities of all employees involved in the 
reporting process is not asked for in the SAR form. Normally the form only asks for 
the identity of the nominated officer or any other  contact person appointed to 
disclose SARs to the authorities.  
 
As it has been held by the Court of Appeal in the recent case, customers may 
require financial institutions to prove the held suspicion in a non-summary trial 
proceeding.7 The question of good faith/bad faith is relevant for the proof of the 
                                                 
4  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, sections 337 & 338 
5  Shah & anr v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd (2009) Case No. 
IHQ/08/0530IHQ/08/0786 
6  Jayesh Shah, Shaleetha Mahabeer v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Limited (2011) Case 
No HQ07X03152, par. 44 
7  Jayesh Shah, Shaleetha Mahabeer v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Limited (2010) Case 
No: A3/2009/0461, par. 39  
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held suspicion.8 This means that financial institutions will potentially be required to 
disclose how, when and from whom these suspicions emanated. Lack of knowledge 
about the precise identity of the individuals involved in the reporting process may 
be considered to be a litigious disadvantage suffered by the claimant.9  
 
The Court of Appeal opened up for a possibility of disclosure of more details 
surrounding the reporting process.10 Having weighed up the public interest in 
confidentiality and the public interest in open justice, the Court ordered the bank to 
identify the departments the involved individuals had worked for and give each of 
them a letter.11 This order provided the claimant with an opportunity to get an idea 
as to the spread of employees involved in the reporting process on four occasions.  
 
If it became apparent that one or two individuals was repeatedly and closely 
involved in the writing or receipt of relevant reports on all four occasions, then the 
claimants would be able to seek the detailed identity of any such employee. If the 
spread of employees involved turned out to be wide, then it would be more difficult 
to obtain the detailed identities of such employees.12  
 
The Court made this order in the light of three circumstances. Firstly, the claimants 
were not, and were not at the time, involved in money laundering according to the 
police investigation. Secondly, the bank's employees were not at any risk of 
reprisals or physical harm from the claimants. Thirdly, the reality of the situation 
was such that the claimants already had a good idea of the identity at least some of 
the individuals involved.13 The timing of disclosure of information about the 
involved employees does matter as the Court of Appeal made it clear.14 While such 
disclosure remained doubtful during the time when investigations into the 
customers’ financial affairs were still under way, that disclosure could take place at 
a later stage.  
 
III CONCLUSION 
 
Confidentiality of identities of reporting employees is thus not absolute even though 
the courts will be approaching an eventual disclosure in a gradual and cautious 
manner. The onus is on financial institutions to prove the held suspicion. They will 
potentially be required to show the basis on which the suspicion was formed, by 
                                                 
8  Jayesh Shah, Shaleetha Mahabeer v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Limited (2011) Case 
No HQ07X03152, par. 10 
9  Ibid, par.26 
10  Jayesh Shah, Shaleetha Mahabeer v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Limited (2010) Case 
No: A3/2009/0461, par. 39 
11  Jayesh Shah, Shaleetha Mahabeer v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Limited (2011) Case 
No HQ07X03152, par. 51 
12  Ibid, par.52 
13  Ibid, par.46 
14  Jayesh Shah, Shaleetha Mahabeer v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Limited (2010) Case 
No: A3/2009/0461, par.39  
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whom, when and how. Given the burden of proof, the reporting process needs to be 
designed carefully. The reporting process has to prevent situations, where one 
individual employee acts out of bad faith, and ensure the wider spread of employees 
involved in the reporting process. In large financial institutions, it is easier to 
accomplish due to a large staff turnover. Meanwhile, this task becomes more 
challenging in smaller financial institutions.  
 
The reporting regime has to be made more flexible. In other EU countries there is 
no consent requirement.15 This means that it is a legal defence for financial 
institutions to report suspicion of money laundering without awaiting consent to 
proceed with the suspicious transaction in question. As the above case shows, 
authorities’ long processing time does no good for a customer relationship. In fact, 
the long processing time creates additional legal risks for financial institutions by 
exposing them to the risk of being sued in contract and tort. Secondly, in other EU 
countries the reporting regime is more flexible in connection with postponed 
reporting. For example, financial institutions may postpone reporting suspicion if 
the transaction in question cannot be delayed or if reporting suspicion may alert the 
customer or otherwise prejudice an investigation.16 The example of situations where 
the transaction cannot be delayed is when the customer risks violating his 
contractual obligations due to transaction delays.17 In the UK, financial institutions 
may postpone reporting if there is a reasonable excuse to do so.18 In the Treasury 
approved guidance, only one example is given in this connection. When a 
transaction which gives rise to concern is already within an automated clearing or 
settlement system, where a delay would lead to a breach of a contractual obligation, 
or where it would breach market settlement or clearing rules, the nominated officer 
may need to let the transaction proceed and report it later. Meanwhile, the guidance 
makes a reservation by saying that the reasonable excuse defence is untested by 
case law and would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.19  
 
The practice of other countries shows that there is more than one approach to the 
reporting regime. The current fight against financial crime depends on the public-
private partnership. The value of suspicious activity reports supplied by financial 
institutions has been acknowledged by law enforcement authorities. Against this 
background, it is of importance to ensure that the public-private partnership does 
not create additional legal risks for financial institutions. Granting reporting 
employees statutory identity protection and eliminating or modifying the consent 
requirement are two possible reforms of the current reporting regime.  
 
                                                 
15  Denmark is an example of such EU country lacking the consent requirement. 
16  Lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask af udbytte og finansiering af 
terrorisme nr 389 af 15/04/2011/The Danish Act on Measures to Prevent Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism nr 389 of 15/04/2011, § 7 (3) 
17  The Danish FSA’s Guidance to the Act on Measures to Prevent Money Laundering 
and Financing of Terrorism, par. 50 
18  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 330 (6a) & 331 (6) 
19  The JMLSG Guidance, Part I, par. 6.47 
